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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises under the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.  Congress enacted TILA in 
1968 to promote the ―informed use of credit.‖  Id. § 1601(a).  
To achieve this goal, TILA sought ―to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to 
compare more readily the various credit terms available to 
him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.‖  Id.  A 
consumer who does not receive the requisite disclosures 
regarding a loan secured by his principal dwelling may 
rescind the loan agreement.  See id. § 1635. 
 Consumers have an absolute right to rescind for three 
business days after closing on the loan.  Id. § 1635(a).  To 
exercise this ―no questions asked‖ right of rescission, the 
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obligor on the mortgage note must simply notify the creditor 
of his intention to do so, consistent with the applicable 
regulations.  Id. § 1635(a), (b).  No court filing is necessary to 
effectuate this right. 
 If the lender fails to make the requisite disclosures 
before the loan commences, the three-day restriction on the 
right of rescission does not begin to run.  A consumer who 
does not receive the requisite disclosures has a right to 
rescind that lasts until three days after the disclosures are 
received.  Id. § 1635(a).  That right of rescission is not 
perpetual, however, even if the consumer never receives all of 
the requisite disclosures.  The right ―expire[s] three years 
after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the 
sale of the property, whichever occurs first.‖  Id. § 1635(f).  
This appeal requires us to decide what action an obligor must 
take to exercise the right of rescission before that three-year 
period expires. 
I 
 Appellants Daniel and Geraldine Sherzer obtained two 
loans secured by mortgages on their principal dwelling from 
Homestar Mortgage Services: one for $705,000 and one for 
$171,000.  The loans closed on August 26, 2004, and 
Homestar later assigned both loans to HSBC Bank.  On May 
11, 2007—less than three years after the closing date—the 
Sherzers‘ counsel wrote a letter to Homestar and HSBC 
(collectively, Lenders), which asserted that Homestar had 
failed to provide all of the disclosures required by TILA.  The 
letter also claimed that these failures were material violations, 
and informed the Lenders that the Sherzers were exercising 
their right to rescind the loan agreements under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635. 
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 HSBC agreed to rescind the smaller of the two loans.  
As for the much larger loan, however, HSBC denied that 
rescission was appropriate, claiming that Homestar had not 
materially violated TILA.  The Sherzers filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against the Lenders on November 30, 2007—
more than three years after their closing date—seeking a 
declaration of rescission, remedies for rescission, and 
damages. 
 The Lenders filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing that suits for rescission filed more than 
three years after a loan‘s closing date are time-barred under 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f), even when the obligor mailed a notice of 
rescission within the three-year period.  The Sherzers 
responded that they exercised their right of rescission and 
rescinded the loan agreement by mailing a written notice; 
they were not also required to file suit within the three-year 
period.  The District Court agreed with the Lenders, granted 
the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the 
case.  The Sherzers appealed. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the Sherzers‘ 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a 
judgment on the pleadings.  Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 2012).  Judgment on the 
pleadings is appropriate if the Lenders, as the movants, 
establish that there is no issue of material fact and that they 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See id.  In 
considering the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 
District Court was required to accept all of the Sherzers‘ 
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in their 
favor.  See id. 
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III 
 The question presented by this appeal is simple: does 
an obligor exercise his right to rescind a loan subject to TILA 
by so notifying the creditor in writing, or must the obligor file 
suit before the three-year period expires?  The answer to the 
question is more complicated. 
 The Sherzers and their amicus, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), argue that § 1635 
―establishes a private, non-judicial mechanism for consumers 
to rescind mortgage loans by providing notice to their 
lenders.‖  Br. of CFBP at 11.  Under this view, an obligor 
who has not received material disclosures can exercise his 
right to rescission and rescind his loan agreement simply by 
sending written notice to the lender within the three-year 
period.  After notice has been sent, the lender and the 
borrower incur certain obligations under § 1635(b).  
Specifically, the lender must return any money or property 
that it received as downpayment, and must take any actions 
necessary to show that it no longer has a security interest in 
the property.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).  If the lender does not 
comply with § 1635(b)—because, for example, it contends 
that all relevant disclosures have been made such that the 
obligor had no right to rescind the agreement—the obligor 
may file an action to recover the money and property owed 
and to quiet title.  Under this view, rescission of the loan 
agreement occurs when a valid notice of rescission is sent, not 
when a court enters an order enforcing the obligor‘s rights.  
The subsequent legal action would simply determine whether 
a valid rescission had occurred, and, if so, the court would 
enforce the respective obligations of the parties.  This 
interpretation of § 1635 accords with the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
description of the rescission process in Williams v. Homestake 
Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1139–40 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(explaining that rescission occurs automatically upon notice), 
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and would lead to the same result reached by the Fourth 
Circuit in Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 
277–78 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a consumer need only 
send notice of rescission within three years of the closing 
date).
1
 
 The Lenders and their amici—the American Bankers 
Association, Consumer Bankers Association, and Consumer 
Mortgage Coalition—argue that a consumer‘s unilateral 
notice of rescission does not automatically rescind a loan 
agreement.  See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 
1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 
F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003); Large v. Conseco Fin. 
Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2002).  The 
Lenders argue that when there is a dispute regarding the 
propriety of rescission, the obligor must file suit within three 
years of the closing date to exercise his right of rescission or 
                                                 
1
 In Gilbert, the Fourth Circuit held that an obligor can 
exercise his right to rescission simply by sending written 
notice of his intent to rescind within the three-year period.  If 
the borrower has sent timely written notice, then he can file 
suit to enforce his right to rescission after the three-year 
period has passed.  The loan agreement is not technically 
rescinded until a court enters an order granting a rescission.  
Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (distinguishing between ―the issue of 
whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind‖ and 
―the issue of whether rescission has, in fact, been completed 
and the contract voided,‖ and explaining that ―[t]o complete 
the rescission and void the contract . . . . [e]ither the creditor 
must acknowledge that the right of rescission is available and 
the parties must unwind the transactions amongst themselves, 
or the borrower must file a lawsuit so that the court may 
enforce the right to rescind.‖ (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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he will be forever time-barred.  This view has been adopted 
by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 
1188; McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 
1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 2012).   Under this view, rescission 
occurs when the parties agree or when a court enters an order 
of rescission.  According to the Lenders, the Supreme Court 
―implicitly recognized‖ that an obligor must both send written 
notice and file suit within three years of the closing date in 
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411–13 (1998). 
 In our opinion, the text of § 1635 and its implementing 
regulation (Regulation Z) supports the view that to timely 
rescind a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid 
notice of rescission.  Beach is consistent with this view, as it 
does not address how an obligor must exercise his right of 
rescission within the three-year period.  Although the 
Lenders‘ amici have raised practical concerns that may arise 
if obligors are permitted to rescind their loans through written 
notice alone, we find ourselves constrained by the text of 
§ 1635 in spite of those concerns. 
A 
 In determining what the Sherzers had to do to rescind 
their loan agreement pursuant to § 1635, we begin with the 
statutory text.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 
U.S. 235, 241 (1989).  When ―the statute‘s language is plain, 
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms.‖  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the 
language of the statute provides that an obligor exercises his 
right of rescission when he sends notice to the creditor; it says 
nothing about a court filing. 
 Sections 1635(a) and (b) explicitly address both how 
the right of rescission is exercised and when the rights and 
corresponding obligations flowing therefrom are incurred by 
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the parties to the loan.  Section 1635(a) provides that ―the 
obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by 
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the 
Bureau, of his intention to do so.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) 
(emphasis added).  Regulation Z, in turn, specifies that the 
obligor must notify his lender ―by mail, telegram, or other 
means of written communication.‖  12 C.F.R. 
§§ 1026.15(a)(2), 1026.23(a)(2).  Neither § 1635(a) nor 
Regulation Z states that the obligor must also file suit; both 
refer exclusively to written notification as the means by 
which an obligor exercises his right of rescission. 
 Section 1635(b), which describes the ―[r]eturn of 
money or property following rescission,‖ suggests that 
rescission occurs automatically when the obligor validly 
exercises his right to rescind.  It states, in relevant part: 
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind 
under subsection (a) of this section, he is not 
liable for any finance or other charge, and any 
security interest given by the obligor, including 
any such interest arising by operation of law, 
becomes void upon such a rescission.  Within 
20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, 
the creditor shall return to the obligor any 
money or property given as earnest money, 
downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any 
action necessary or appropriate to reflect the 
termination of any security interest created 
under the transaction. 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (emphasis added).  When an obligor 
exercises his right to rescind as defined in § 1635(a)—that is, 
as Regulation Z states, when he notifies the creditor by mail, 
telegram, or other means of written communication that he is 
rescinding—he is free of any liability for payments, the 
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security interest ―becomes void,‖ and the creditor incurs an 
obligation to return money or property given.  As with 
§ 1635(a), there is no mention of filing a suit at law or equity.  
Rather, § 1635(b) states that the creditor must return money 
or property ―[w]ithin 20 days after receipt of a notice of 
rescission‖—not within twenty days of a court order stating 
that the obligor is entitled to rescind.  See id.
2
 
 Additional support for the proposition that rescission 
occurs upon transmittal of valid written notice is also found in 
§ 1635(f).  That section, which establishes the three-year 
limitation, makes no mention of filing a suit or bringing a 
claim: 
An obligor‘s right of rescission shall expire 
three years after the date of consummation of 
the transaction or upon the sale of the property, 
whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact 
that the information and forms required under 
this section or any other disclosures required 
under this part have not been delivered to the 
obligor . . . . 
 
Id. § 1635(f) (emphasis added); see also Beach, 523 U.S. at 
417 (―[Section 1635(f)] says nothing in terms of bringing an 
                                                 
2
 Regulation Z uses similar language, except that it 
refers to ―[w]hen a consumer rescinds a transaction,‖ as 
opposed to ―when an obligor exercises his right to rescind.‖  
12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.15(d), 1026.23(d) (stating that the 
―security interest . . . becomes void‖ and that the ―creditor 
shall return‖ money or property given).  The reference to a 
consumer rescinding the transaction—as opposed to a court 
granting rescission—further supports the view that rescission 
occurs upon transmission of valid written notice. 
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action but instead provides that the ‗right of rescission [under 
the Act] shall expire‘ at the end of the time period.‖); 
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327 (―Section 1635 does not 
explicitly establish a time limit in which borrowers must 
bring suit for rescission if a lender does not comply with the 
rescission request.  Indeed, it ‗says nothing in terms of 
bringing an action‘ or ‗a suit‘s commencement.‘‖ (quoting 
Beach, 523 U.S. at 417)).  In contrast, statutes that 
circumscribe the time for bringing suit—statutes of limitation 
and statutes of repose alike—typically refer either to causes 
of action or the commencement of a civil action.
3
  Thus, the 
                                                 
3
 See Beach, 523 U.S. at 416 (―[M]ost statutes of 
limitation provide either that ‗all actions . . . shall be brought 
within‘ or ‗no action . . . shall be brought more than‘ so many 
years after ‗the cause thereof accrued.‘‖ (quoting Note, 
Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1177, 1179 (1950))); Lieberman v. Cambridge 
Partners, L.L.C., 432 F.3d 482, 490 (3d Cir. 2005) (―Unlike a 
statute of limitations, a statute of repose is not a limitation of 
a plaintiff‘s remedy, but rather defines the right involved in 
terms of the time allowed to bring suit.‖ (quoting P. Stolz 
Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004))); 
see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (―No action shall be 
maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, 
unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation and within three years after such 
violation.‖) (recognized as a statute of repose in Lampf, 
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350, 360 n.6, 363 (1991)); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5536(a) 
(―[A] civil action or proceeding . . . must be commenced 
within 12 years after completion of construction of such 
improvement to recover damages . . . .‖) (recognized as a 
statute of repose in Luzadder v. Despatch Oven Co., 834 F.2d 
355, 358 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
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absence of any reference to causes of action or the 
commencement of suits in § 1635 also suggests that 
rescission may be accomplished without a formal court filing. 
 
B 
Only two provisions in § 1635 make any mention of 
courts, and both are silent as to whether court involvement is 
necessary to effect rescission.  First, § 1635(b) notes that 
―[t]he procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply 
except when otherwise ordered by a court.‖  Under this 
provision a court may intervene in the process that ensues 
after the obligor has sent written notification.  That is, if 
either the obligor or the creditor sues after the obligor sends 
notice of rescission, the court has the discretion to modify the 
order in which the obligor and creditor are required to 
exchange property or disclaim security interests.  See 
Williams, 968 F.2d at 1141–42.  This provision in no way 
suggests that court involvement is a sine qua non for 
rescission. 
Second, § 1635(g), which was added as part of the 
1980 amendments to TILA, states that ―in addition to 
rescission the court may award relief under section 1640 of 
this title for violations of this subchapter not relating to the 
right to rescind.‖  This provision was added simply to clarify 
that an obligor who rescinds pursuant to § 1635 is not 
precluded from also seeking damages under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640.  See Brown v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 349 F. 
Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (―Prior to the [1980] 
amendment, some courts did not allow plaintiffs to 
concurrently sue for rescission under § 1635 and damages 
under § 1640, but instead required borrowers to elect one of 
the two remedies.‖); S. Rep. No. 96-368, at 29 (1979) (―[T]he 
bill explicitly provides that a consumer who exercises his 
right to rescind may also bring suit under the Act for other 
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violations not relating to rescission.  The Act is currently 
ambiguous on this issue, and this section codifies the majority 
position of the courts.‖); see also Vallies v. Sky Bank, 591 
F.3d 152, 163 n.17 (3d Cir. 2009) (―Section 1635 provides 
the rescission remedy independently, explicitly, and in 
addition to civil damages under § 1640.‖ (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(g))); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 
576 (7th Cir. 2008) (―Section 1635(g) is a simple remedial 
cross-reference; it provides that rescission plaintiffs may also 
seek damages under § 1640.  It does no more.‖).  Thus, 
§ 1635(g) sheds no light on what an obligor must do to 
exercise his right of rescission. 
 In sum, nothing in the text of the statute supports the 
view that ―it is the filing of an action in a court . . . that is 
required to invoke the right limited by the TILA statute of 
repose,‖ Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183 (rejecting the notice-
only view).  See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (―Simply stated, 
neither 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z says anything 
about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse to graft such a 
requirement upon them.‖).  But see Large, 292 F.3d at 54–55 
(suggesting that the ―natural reading of [the] language [in 
§ 1635(b)] is that the security interest becomes void . . . either 
because the creditor acknowledges that the right of rescission 
is available, or because the appropriate decision maker has so 
determined,‖ but failing to explain what statutory language 
―natural[ly]‖ supports that reading).4  Adopting the 
                                                 
 
4
 The Lenders‘ amici argue that rescission, as it is 
generally understood, ―is a court-ordered ‗unwinding‘ of a 
contract,‖ which necessarily ―involves a judicial termination 
of a party‘s contractual obligations.‖  Br. of ABA at 7 
(quoting Jones v. InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 
2002) (discussing whether parties were entitled to the 
equitable remedy of rescission)).  This is only partly true.  
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interpretation of the statute advocated by the Lenders would 
require us to infer that the statute contains additional, 
unwritten requirements with which obligors must comply—
an inference that seems particularly inappropriate in light of 
the fact that TILA is a remedial statute that we must construe 
liberally.  See Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 
499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998).  We thus join the Fourth Circuit in 
holding that an obligor exercises his right of rescission by 
                                                                                                             
Historically, two types of rescission have been available to 
parties in other contexts: rescission in equity and rescission at 
law.  See Omlid v. Sweeny, 484 N.W.2d 486, 490 & n.3 (N.D. 
1992) (distinguishing between rescission at law and rescission 
in equity); Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.8 (2d ed. 
1993) (same).  The first, rescission in equity, does involve a 
court-ordered unwinding of a contract.  See Omlid, 484 
N.W.2d at 490 n.3 (explaining that ―the contract continues to 
exist until set aside by the equity decree‖ (quoting Hugh S. 
Koford, Comment, Rescission at Law and in Equity, 36 Calif. 
L. Rev. 606, 606 (1948))).  But the second, rescission at law, 
operates akin to the way the Sherzers suggest that § 1635 
operates: it occurs automatically when parties have taken the 
requisite action, and any subsequent suit is brought to enforce 
the rights flowing from rescission.  Williams, 968 F.2d at 
1140 (describing § 1635(b) as a ―reordering of common law 
rules governing rescission‖); see also Peterson v. Highland 
Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (―When a 
party gives notice of rescission, it has effected the rescission, 
and any subsequent judicial proceedings are for the purpose 
of confirming and enforcing that rescission.‖); Omlid, 484 
N.W.2d at 490 n.3; Jones v. Bohn, 311 N.W.2d 211, 213 
(S.D. 1981).  Thus, little can be inferred from the way that 
rescission operates in other contexts, as the interpretations 
proffered by both parties have historical analogues. 
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sending the creditor valid written notice of rescission, and 
need not also file suit within the three-year period.
5
  See 
Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278; see also Williams, 968 F.2d at 
1139–40 (discussing whether a court may modify procedures 
for rescission, and explaining in the course of that discussion 
that rescission occurs automatically upon notice). 
 
IV 
 As we indicated at the outset, the answer to the 
question presented by this appeal is not pellucid, although we 
do think it is controlled by the statutory language.  While the 
                                                 
5
 We disagree, to some extent, with the Fourth 
Circuit‘s characterization of the rescission process.  As noted 
above, the court in Gilbert distinguished between ―the issue 
of whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind‖ and 
―the issue of whether rescission has, in fact, been completed 
and the contract voided.‖  678 F.3d at 277.  It determined that 
borrowers need only send written notice within three years to 
exercise the right of rescission.  Borrowers who had timely 
exercised their right of rescission could file suit after the 
three-year period had passed.  Id. at 277–78.  It also 
explained, however, that rescission does not occur 
automatically; the actual rescission of the loan agreement 
occurs when the parties agree to rescission or when the court 
enters an order granting rescission.  Id. at 277.  We find that 
the statutory language of §§ 1635(a) and (b) suggests that 
rescission occurs at the time the obligor exercises his right to 
rescission, and hold today that the contract is voided at the 
time valid notice is sent, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).  
We agree, however, with the Fourth Circuit‘s determination 
that the § 1635(f) bar does not preclude consumers from 
filing suit after the three-year period has passed, as long as 
they send written notice of rescission within that three-year 
period. 
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Lenders and their amici raise several concerns worthy of our 
careful attention, we find them unpersuasive for the reasons 
that follow. 
A 
 First, the Lenders and their amici argue that our 
interpretation of § 1635 is foreclosed by the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Beach.  This view has been adopted by two of our 
sister courts.  See Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1182 (―[W]e believe 
that Beach is dispositive of the instant question.‖); McOmie-
Gray, 667 F.3d at 1328 (―Were we writing on a blank slate, 
we might consider whether notification within three years of 
the transaction could extend the time limit imposed by § 
1635(f).  But under the case law of this court and the Supreme 
Court, rescission suits must be brought within three years 
from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice 
of rescission is delivered within that three-year period.‖).  
According to this view, Beach implicitly recognized that it is 
insufficient for consumers to mail notice to their lenders 
within the three-year period required by § 1635(f); they must 
file suit within the three-year period as well.  E.g. Rosenfield, 
681 F.3d at 1182 (adopting the view that ―the Supreme Court 
has definitively foreclosed—through the implicit instruction 
of Beach—any argument that a consumer may exercise her 
right to rescind [by notifying the creditor of her intent to 
rescind in writing within the prescribed time limit].‖). 
 Unlike these courts, we do not read Beach to answer 
the question presented in this appeal.  Beach addressed 
whether obligors who failed to provide notice of rescission 
within the three-year period may nevertheless assert 
rescission as an affirmative defense in foreclosure 
proceedings.  Beach, 523 U.S. at 411–13.  The borrowers in 
Beach refinanced their house in 1986, and took no action 
between 1986 and 1989 that could be construed as exercising 
their right to rescind.  They simply stopped making mortgage 
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payments five years after the closing, and the bank began 
foreclosure proceedings.  Id. at 413.  During the foreclosure 
proceedings, the borrowers asserted as an affirmative defense 
that the bank had failed to provide certain material 
disclosures.  Id. at 413–14.  They argued that because 
§ 1635(f) is a statute of limitations, it bars only the 
commencement of a suit, not the defensive use of rescission.  
Id. at 415. 
 In addressing the borrowers‘ claims, the Supreme 
Court considered ―whether § 1635(f) is a statute of limitation, 
that is, whether it operates, with the lapse of time, to 
extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim or 
merely to bar the remedy for its enforcement.‖  Id. at 416 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  It held that 
§ 1635(f) does not merely limit the time for filing a suit; 
instead, it provides that the right of rescission itself lasts for 
three years.  Id. at 417 (explaining that § 1635(f) is phrased in 
terms of the duration of the right).  As a result, obligors who 
have not exercised their right of rescission within the three-
year period cannot later assert rescission as an affirmative 
defense.  See id. at 417–19.  Thus, under Beach, an obligor 
must exercise his right of rescission within three years of the 
commencement of the loan; the right is extinguished once that 
period has passed.  Id. at 419. 
 Critical to this appeal, nowhere in Beach does the 
Court address how an obligor must exercise his right of 
rescission within that three-year period.  This omission is 
unsurprising since the obligors in Beach did not claim to have 
taken any action to rescind their loan before the bank initiated 
foreclosure proceedings.  See Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278 (―The 
Beach Court did not address the proper method of exercising 
a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right.‖); Calvin 
v. Am. Fid. Mortg. Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 1672064, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. May 3, 2011) (―Beach determined only that the 
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right to rescission expired after three years for purposes of its 
assertion as a defense as well as for bringing suit.  Beach did 
not discuss how the right must be asserted within the three-
year period.‖ (internal citation omitted)).  Nevertheless, the 
Lenders argue that certain language in the opinion implies 
that, when rescission is disputed, obligors must file suit 
within three years of the closing. 
 Some of the language upon which the Lenders rely has 
no obvious relevance to whether rescission is effected by 
sending notice or through filing suit.  For example, the 
Lenders highlight the following statement: ―[T]he Act permits 
no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 
3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.‖  Beach, 523 U.S. at 419; 
see also Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187 (emphasizing this 
statement); McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1328 (same).  This 
passage is consistent with the view that obligors must file suit 
within three years, but it is also consistent with our view that 
they need only send notice of rescission to their lenders 
during that period, if that is how the right of rescission is 
exercised.  The most that can be gleaned from the oft-quoted 
statement is that, however the right of rescission is to be 
exercised, it must be done within three years. 
 Other language identified by the Lenders provides only 
weak support for the view that obligors must file suit within 
three years.  They emphasize the following statement: 
Section 1635(f) . . . takes us beyond any 
question whether it limits more than the time 
for bringing a suit, by governing the life of the 
underlying right as well.  The subsection says 
nothing in terms of bringing an action but 
instead provides that the ‗right of rescission 
[under the Act] shall expire‘ at the end of the 
time period.  It talks not of a suit‘s 
 19 
 
commencement but of a right‘s duration, which 
it addresses in terms so straightforward as to 
render any limitation on the time for seeking a 
remedy superfluous. 
Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 (alterations in original); see also 
Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1181 (emphasizing this statement); 
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1328 (same).  The Lenders are 
correct that some of this passage could be read as inconsistent 
with the notice-only view; if obligors could exercise their 
right of rescission simply by sending written notice within 
three years, and then file a suit to enforce the rights flowing 
from rescission after the three-year period has passed, then a 
―limitation on the time for seeking a remedy‖ would not be 
―superfluous.‖  But portions of the passage could be used as 
support for our notice-only view, as well.  The Court 
explicitly observed that § 1635(f) ―says nothing in terms of 
bringing an action,‖ Beach, 523 U.S. at 417, and this silence 
supports the Sherzers‘ view that § 1635 operates as a private 
enforcement mechanism.  In any event, because the Court 
was not considering the method by which an obligor must 
exercise his right of rescission, the passage provides only 
tenuous support for either view.  In resolving the question at 
issue here, we rely on the statutory language, not on the 
debatable implications of dicta. 
B 
 The Lenders and their amici also suggest that it would 
be problematic for a court to recognize that rescission has 
occurred after the three-year period has passed because the 
obligor would no longer have a ―right of rescission‖ to 
enforce at the time of the suit.  E.g. Br. of ABA at 7 
(―Perhaps more fundamentally, courts have never assumed 
the role of enforcing a right that has already been 
extinguished.‖).  But while the obligor no longer has the right 
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of rescission after the three-year period has passed, he does 
have the right to the return of his property and to clear title—
the rights flowing from rescission—and it is these rights that 
permit him to bring suit. 
 We also note that, if an obligor could never seek court 
enforcement after his right of rescission has expired, as the 
Lenders suggest, it is difficult to imagine how the obligor‘s 
three-day, absolute right of rescission could operate 
effectively.  If an obligor who has received all material 
disclosures does not exercise his three-day right to rescission, 
it expires; he has no right, on the fourth day, to demand 
rescission.
6
  But if the obligor does exercise this right, then 
the lender has twenty days to respond by returning any money 
or property that it has received from the obligor, and to ―take 
any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination 
of any security interest created under the transaction.‖  15 
U.S.C. § 1635(b).  If, after twenty days have passed, the 
lender fails to respond to the obligor‘s notice, the obligor may 
file suit against the lender—even though the three-day period 
in which he has the absolute right of rescission has long since 
passed.  The obligor is not required to file suit against the 
creditor during the three-day period; indeed, because the 
lender has twenty days to respond to the consumer‘s notice, 
                                                 
6
 Nor could the consumer raise the fact that he had a 
three-day right of rescission as an affirmative defense in later 
foreclosure proceedings, or claim that equitable tolling should 
extend the three-day period.  Thus, like § 1635(f), this 
provision operates in at least some respects like a statute of 
repose.  See, e.g., Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1181 (finding that, 
because the Beach Court held that the consumers could not 
assert the right to rescind as an affirmative defense in 
foreclosure proceedings under § 1635(f), § 1635(f) is a statute 
of repose). 
 21 
 
the consumer would seemingly have no basis for filing a suit 
during that time.  But he can file suit to compel the lender to 
comply with § 1635(b) if the lender does not, for example, 
return within twenty days any loan fees that were paid.  After 
the three-day period has expired, the obligor no longer has a 
―right of rescission‖—but because he exercised that right in a 
timely manner, he now has a statutory right to his property 
and to clear title.  The three-year right of rescission should be 
understood to work in the same way: it expires if it is not 
exercised in three years, but borrowers who have exercised 
the right can file suit after the three-year period has passed. 
C 
 The Lenders‘ amici express several practical concerns 
that may arise if rescission can be effected simply by sending 
valid written notice.  First and foremost is the problem of the 
obligor transmitting notice of rescission when he has no cause 
to do so.  They argue that allowing obligors to unilaterally 
rescind by sending notice empowers them to void a lender‘s 
security interest, even when the obligor has, in fact, received 
all required disclosures.  Second, they argue that this 
interpretation may create increased uncertainty with respect to 
title, and could increase costs for both lenders and consumers.  
We find the first concern unwarranted, and the second 
concern, while likely valid, does not permit us to disregard 
the text of § 1635. 
 
 According to the Lenders‘ amici, under the notice-only 
interpretation, the lender‘s security interest would become 
instantly void by law even when the obligor sends an invalid 
notice.  This concern has also been expressed by the Ninth 
Circuit.  See Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1172 (―[I]t cannot be that 
the security interest vanishes immediately upon the giving of 
notice.  Otherwise, a borrower could get out from under a 
secured loan simply by claiming TILA violations, whether or 
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not the lender had actually committed any.‖).  The notice-
only holding we adopt today will not lead to such a result.  
Rescission of the loan agreement occurs when an obligor with 
a valid TILA claim provides the lender with written notice.  
That notice may be ineffective because the obligor has, in 
fact, received all material disclosures.  It may also be 
ineffective because it is fraudulent—if, for example, the 
obligor does not have the intent or the ability to return the 
loan proceeds that he has received from the lender.
7
  If the 
borrower fails to exercise a valid right to rescission, the 
lender maintains its security interest in the property and does 
not incur any obligations toward the borrower.  A lender who 
believes an obligor‘s notice of rescission is invalid may 
choose to file suit to resolve any uncertainty. 
 
 Even when the obligor does validly rescind the loan, 
certain protections ensure that the lender does not become an 
unsecured creditor in the event the obligor cannot repay the 
loan proceeds.  Section 1635(b) provides that the lender‘s 
security interest ―becomes void‖ at the time of rescission—
before the obligor incurs any repayment obligations.  But if 
the obligor rescinds his loan and then later determines that he 
does not have the ability to return the loan proceeds, courts 
are not required to treat the lender as an unsecured creditor.  
One of the goals of § 1635 is ―to return the parties most 
nearly to the position they held prior to entering into the 
transaction.‖  Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140.  To achieve this 
goal, courts are permitted to rearrange the parties‘ obligations 
                                                 
7
  By sending a notice of rescission, the obligor 
becomes obliged to tender any property he has received from 
the lender ―[u]pon the performance of the creditor‘s 
obligations.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).  Thus, a notice of 
rescission is not effective if the obligor lacks either the 
intention or the ability to perform, i.e., repay the loan. 
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to one another under § 1635(b).  A court may find that 
rescission has occurred, but choose to condition the release of 
a security interest on the return of the loan proceeds to protect 
the lender. 
 
Second, the Lenders‘ amici contend that allowing 
obligors to rescind by written notice alone may cloud title 
held by banks on foreclosure, a concern noted by the Supreme 
Court in Beach.  523 U.S. at 418–19.  If obligors were 
required to bring suit to exercise the right of rescission, both 
the lender and the obligor could know with more certainty the 
status of the loan agreement (whether is has been rescinded, 
or may be in the future) and the secured property (whether the 
lender has a security interest in it).  Three years after the 
closing date of the loan, if the obligor had not filed suit 
demanding rescission, he would never be able to claim that 
rescission should have occurred.  Ten years after the closing 
date, if the lender initiates foreclosure proceedings, it could 
be confident that the obligor would not be able to claim as a 
defense that the agreement had actually been rescinded. 
 
The same is not true if obligors are only required to 
send written notice to rescind.  An obligor who has sent a 
written notice of rescission to his lender but received no 
response will not be able to wait indefinitely before filing a 
lawsuit to enforce the rescission, recover his property, and 
obtain the release of the security interest because statutes of 
limitation will constrain his ability to file suit.  See Graham 
Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414 (2005) (explaining that, if a federal 
statute does not expressly supply a limitations period, courts 
―generally ‗borrow‘ the most closely analogous state 
limitations period‖); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146–50 (1987) (borrowing statute 
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of limitations from an analogous federal statute).
8
  Thus, if 
the obligor mails a notice of rescission but takes no action for 
ten years, the lender can at least be assured that the obligor 
will not be able to file a timely court action.  If, however, ten 
years after the letter was sent the lender initiates foreclosure 
proceedings, the obligor may be able to raise the fact of 
rescission as a defense.  See Beach, 523 U.S. at 415 
(explaining that ―as a general matter a defendant‘s right to 
plead ‗recoupment,‘ a ‗defense arising out of some feature of 
the transaction upon which the plaintiff‘s action is grounded,‘ 
survives the expiration of the period provided by a statute of 
limitation that would otherwise bar the recoupment claim as 
an independent cause of action.‖ (internal citations omitted)).  
Permitting obligors to assert defenses related to rescission 
years after the three-year period has passed would be costly,
9
 
                                                 
8
 The CFPB suggests that, in determining whether an 
obligor seeking to enforce his rights has filed suit in a timely 
manner, courts may borrow from the one-year statute of 
limitations in § 1640 or from analogous state statutes of 
limitations.  Br. of CFPB at 26 n.6; see, e.g., In re Hunter, 
400 B.R. 651, 661–62 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (borrowing 
from § 1640); Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation 
Dist., 545 U.S. at 422 (borrowing from state limitations 
period).  Because the Sherzers filed suit six months after 
sending the notice of rescission, we do not reach the question 
of what statute of limitations would apply in this context. 
 
9
 As Lenders‘ amici correctly note, rescission is 
effectively an ―interest-free loan,‖ so ―the longer one allows 
the right of rescission to be exercised, the greater the benefit 
to the consumer, and the greater the penalty to the creditor.‖  
Br. of ABA at 13 (quoting Daniel Rothstein, Truth in 
Lending: The Right to Rescind and the Statute of Limitations, 
14 Pace L. Rev. 633, 657 (1994)). 
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and the Lenders and their amici contend that this would 
effectively create the same problem that the Supreme Court 
sought to avoid in Beach.  See id. at 418–19 (recognizing that 
―a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank‘s title on 
foreclosure,‖ and so ―Congress may well have chosen to 
circumscribe that risk‖ by refusing to allow parties to exercise 
their right of rescission defensively after the three-year period 
has passed). 
 
The practical problem faced by the Court in Beach was 
much broader than the problems the Lenders and their amici 
argue a written notice regime will create.  In Beach, the 
question was whether obligors who have not taken any action 
to rescind their loan may nevertheless assert rescission as a 
defense in foreclosure proceedings.  If obligors had been 
permitted to take that kind of action, it would have created 
tremendous uncertainty for the banks with respect to their 
interest in the secured property.  During foreclosure 
proceedings, any obligor might claim that he did not receive 
the requisite disclosures, and the bank might lose its interest 
in the secured property.  Here, in contrast, the uncertainty is 
substantially more cabined because it would exist only as to 
those loans for which obligors have sent the bank written 
notice of rescission within the three-year period.  
Additionally, lenders in these circumstances have options to 
resolve that uncertainty.  Once alerted to the cloud on its title, 
a lender could sue to confirm that the obligor‘s rescission was 
invalid or do nothing and assume the risk that a court might 
later rule that the rescission was valid. 
 
This is not to deny, however, that permitting obligors 
to rescind by written notice could potentially impose 
additional costs on banks, as it costs little for an obligor to 
send a letter to the lender while, on the other hand, the lender 
would incur some cost to sue to determine title.  This may, in 
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turn, be more costly for borrowers insofar as lenders—like all 
businesses—pass along costs occasioned by regulation or 
taxation to their customers.  See Michael Aikins, Off-Contract 
Harms: The Real Effect of Liberal Rescission Rights on 
Contract Price, 121 Yale L.J. Online 69, 79 (2011).  But the 
fact that this approach may be more costly is not, in and of 
itself, a reason to disregard the text of the statute.  Many 
TILA regulations increase costs for lenders (and, in turn, 
consumers), and it is for Congress—not the courts—to 
determine whether those increases are warranted.  See Fla. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 
52 (2008) (noting that it is inappropriate for courts to 
substitute their view of policy for the legislation that has been 
passed by Congress). 
* * * * 
 An obligor‘s right to rescind a loan pursuant to TILA 
―expire[s] three years after the date of consummation of the 
transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs 
first.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).  According to the most natural 
reading of the statutory language, an obligor must send valid 
written notice of rescission before the three years expire.  
Because the statute says nothing about filing a suit within that 
three-year period, we hold that the District Court erred as a 
matter of law when it dismissed the Sherzers‘ complaint as 
untimely.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
